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authorcharveey2022-06-17 14:55:24 +0000
committercharveey2022-06-17 14:55:24 +0000
commitc807d58a63caf6595ee22c20b2cce20b66c9c589 (patch)
treed0259fe17d428c29d07f3083ff86c44ab0cf03eb /0001-ZEN-Add-sysctl-and-CONFIG-to-disallow-unprivileged-C.patch
parentc5f7cb59eae34d9b86d127ba84741a63735bbd63 (diff)
downloadaur-linux-bootsplash.tar.gz
updated to Linux 5.17.7
Diffstat (limited to '0001-ZEN-Add-sysctl-and-CONFIG-to-disallow-unprivileged-C.patch')
-rw-r--r--0001-ZEN-Add-sysctl-and-CONFIG-to-disallow-unprivileged-C.patch132
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 132 deletions
diff --git a/0001-ZEN-Add-sysctl-and-CONFIG-to-disallow-unprivileged-C.patch b/0001-ZEN-Add-sysctl-and-CONFIG-to-disallow-unprivileged-C.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index a40d2c23b3c4..000000000000
--- a/0001-ZEN-Add-sysctl-and-CONFIG-to-disallow-unprivileged-C.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,132 +0,0 @@
-From c701fa45808d40c6ce027c31c3e318bb678cb5b3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: "Jan Alexander Steffens (heftig)" <jan.steffens@gmail.com>
-Date: Mon, 16 Sep 2019 04:53:20 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 1/5] ZEN: Add sysctl and CONFIG to disallow unprivileged
- CLONE_NEWUSER
-
-Our default behavior continues to match the vanilla kernel.
----
- init/Kconfig | 16 ++++++++++++++++
- kernel/fork.c | 15 +++++++++++++++
- kernel/sysctl.c | 12 ++++++++++++
- kernel/user_namespace.c | 7 +++++++
- 4 files changed, 50 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/init/Kconfig b/init/Kconfig
-index 74a5ac65644f..965a628556e8 100644
---- a/init/Kconfig
-+++ b/init/Kconfig
-@@ -1102,6 +1102,22 @@ config USER_NS
-
- If unsure, say N.
-
-+config USER_NS_UNPRIVILEGED
-+ bool "Allow unprivileged users to create namespaces"
-+ default y
-+ depends on USER_NS
-+ help
-+ When disabled, unprivileged users will not be able to create
-+ new namespaces. Allowing users to create their own namespaces
-+ has been part of several recent local privilege escalation
-+ exploits, so if you need user namespaces but are
-+ paranoid^Wsecurity-conscious you want to disable this.
-+
-+ This setting can be overridden at runtime via the
-+ kernel.unprivileged_userns_clone sysctl.
-+
-+ If unsure, say Y.
-+
- config PID_NS
- bool "PID Namespaces"
- default y
-diff --git a/kernel/fork.c b/kernel/fork.c
-index 48ed22774efa..ec61454a18d5 100644
---- a/kernel/fork.c
-+++ b/kernel/fork.c
-@@ -106,6 +106,11 @@
-
- #define CREATE_TRACE_POINTS
- #include <trace/events/task.h>
-+#ifdef CONFIG_USER_NS
-+extern int unprivileged_userns_clone;
-+#else
-+#define unprivileged_userns_clone 0
-+#endif
-
- /*
- * Minimum number of threads to boot the kernel
-@@ -1848,6 +1853,10 @@ static __latent_entropy struct task_struct *copy_process(
- if ((clone_flags & (CLONE_NEWUSER|CLONE_FS)) == (CLONE_NEWUSER|CLONE_FS))
- return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
-
-+ if ((clone_flags & CLONE_NEWUSER) && !unprivileged_userns_clone)
-+ if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
-+ return ERR_PTR(-EPERM);
-+
- /*
- * Thread groups must share signals as well, and detached threads
- * can only be started up within the thread group.
-@@ -2948,6 +2957,12 @@ int ksys_unshare(unsigned long unshare_flags)
- if (unshare_flags & CLONE_NEWNS)
- unshare_flags |= CLONE_FS;
-
-+ if ((unshare_flags & CLONE_NEWUSER) && !unprivileged_userns_clone) {
-+ err = -EPERM;
-+ if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
-+ goto bad_unshare_out;
-+ }
-+
- err = check_unshare_flags(unshare_flags);
- if (err)
- goto bad_unshare_out;
-diff --git a/kernel/sysctl.c b/kernel/sysctl.c
-index 8a176d8727a3..9500597739a2 100644
---- a/kernel/sysctl.c
-+++ b/kernel/sysctl.c
-@@ -110,6 +110,9 @@ extern int core_uses_pid;
- extern char core_pattern[];
- extern unsigned int core_pipe_limit;
- #endif
-+#ifdef CONFIG_USER_NS
-+extern int unprivileged_userns_clone;
-+#endif
- extern int pid_max;
- extern int pid_max_min, pid_max_max;
- extern int percpu_pagelist_fraction;
-@@ -534,6 +537,15 @@ static struct ctl_table kern_table[] = {
- .proc_handler = proc_dointvec,
- },
- #endif
-+#ifdef CONFIG_USER_NS
-+ {
-+ .procname = "unprivileged_userns_clone",
-+ .data = &unprivileged_userns_clone,
-+ .maxlen = sizeof(int),
-+ .mode = 0644,
-+ .proc_handler = proc_dointvec,
-+ },
-+#endif
- #ifdef CONFIG_PROC_SYSCTL
- {
- .procname = "tainted",
-diff --git a/kernel/user_namespace.c b/kernel/user_namespace.c
-index 8eadadc478f9..c36ecd19562c 100644
---- a/kernel/user_namespace.c
-+++ b/kernel/user_namespace.c
-@@ -21,6 +21,13 @@
- #include <linux/bsearch.h>
- #include <linux/sort.h>
-
-+/* sysctl */
-+#ifdef CONFIG_USER_NS_UNPRIVILEGED
-+int unprivileged_userns_clone = 1;
-+#else
-+int unprivileged_userns_clone;
-+#endif
-+
- static struct kmem_cache *user_ns_cachep __read_mostly;
- static DEFINE_MUTEX(userns_state_mutex);
-
---
-2.27.0
-