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authorBrian Bidulock2019-07-26 13:45:44 -0600
committerBrian Bidulock2019-07-26 13:45:44 -0600
commit4d67bd6a10253dcc952ee7634015242f5848fce3 (patch)
tree96fbac09ff5fa009b8c1a9f733d84fb8e235e75b /openssl1.1.patch
parent973a9eff819a73a2df40686b16d699f146bfa39a (diff)
downloadaur-ssvnc-nojava.tar.gz
build with current openssl
Diffstat (limited to 'openssl1.1.patch')
-rw-r--r--openssl1.1.patch199
1 files changed, 199 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/openssl1.1.patch b/openssl1.1.patch
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..0ee278f9eea
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl1.1.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,199 @@
+--- a/vncstorepw/ultravnc_dsm_helper.c
++++ b/vncstorepw/ultravnc_dsm_helper.c
+@@ -414,7 +414,9 @@ void enc_do(char *ciph, char *keyfile, c
+ if (strstr(p, "md5+") == p) {
+ Digest = EVP_md5(); p += strlen("md5+");
+ } else if (strstr(p, "sha+") == p) {
+- Digest = EVP_sha(); p += strlen("sha+");
++ fprintf(stderr, "%s: obsolete hash algorithm: SHA-0\n",
++ prog, s);
++ exit(1);
+ } else if (strstr(p, "sha1+") == p) {
+ Digest = EVP_sha1(); p += strlen("sha1+");
+ } else if (strstr(p, "ripe+") == p) {
+@@ -655,8 +657,10 @@ static void enc_xfer(int sock_fr, int so
+ */
+ unsigned char E_keystr[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH];
+ unsigned char D_keystr[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH];
+- EVP_CIPHER_CTX E_ctx, D_ctx;
+- EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = NULL;
++ //openssl1.1.patch - Do NOT create two context and only use one
++ // - that's silly.
++ //EVP_CIPHER_CTX *E_ctx, *D_ctx;
++ EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
+
+ unsigned char buf[BSIZE], out[BSIZE];
+ unsigned char *psrc = NULL, *keystr;
+@@ -698,11 +702,14 @@ static void enc_xfer(int sock_fr, int so
+ encsym = encrypt ? "+" : "-";
+
+ /* use the encryption/decryption context variables below */
++ ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
++ if (!ctx) {
++ fprintf(stderr, "Failed to create encryption/decryption context.\n");
++ goto finished;
++ }
+ if (encrypt) {
+- ctx = &E_ctx;
+ keystr = E_keystr;
+ } else {
+- ctx = &D_ctx;
+ keystr = D_keystr;
+ }
+
+@@ -797,7 +804,6 @@ static void enc_xfer(int sock_fr, int so
+ if (whoops) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: %s - WARNING: MSRC4 mode and IGNORING random salt\n", prog, encstr);
+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: %s - WARNING: and initialization vector!!\n", prog, encstr);
+- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(ctx);
+ if (pw_in) {
+ /* for pw=xxxx a md5 hash is used */
+ EVP_BytesToKey(Cipher, Digest, NULL, (unsigned char *) keydata,
+@@ -816,7 +822,6 @@ static void enc_xfer(int sock_fr, int so
+
+ EVP_BytesToKey(Cipher, Digest, NULL, (unsigned char *) keydata,
+ keydata_len, 1, keystr, ivec);
+- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(ctx);
+ EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctx, Cipher, NULL, keystr, ivec,
+ encrypt);
+ }
+@@ -836,9 +841,9 @@ static void enc_xfer(int sock_fr, int so
+ in_salt = salt;
+ }
+
+- if (ivec_size < Cipher->iv_len && !securevnc) {
++ if (ivec_size < EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(Cipher) && !securevnc) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: %s - WARNING: short IV %d < %d\n",
+- prog, encstr, ivec_size, Cipher->iv_len);
++ prog, encstr, ivec_size, EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(Cipher));
+ }
+
+ /* make the hashed value and place in keystr */
+@@ -877,9 +882,6 @@ static void enc_xfer(int sock_fr, int so
+ }
+
+
+- /* initialize the context */
+- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(ctx);
+-
+
+ /* set the cipher & initialize */
+
+@@ -986,6 +988,7 @@ static void enc_xfer(int sock_fr, int so
+ /* transfer done (viewer exited or some error) */
+ finished:
+
++ if (ctx) EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
+ fprintf(stderr, "\n%s: %s - close sock_to\n", prog, encstr);
+ close(sock_to);
+
+@@ -1060,14 +1063,14 @@ static int securevnc_server_rsa_save_dia
+ }
+
+ static char *rsa_md5_sum(unsigned char* rsabuf) {
+- EVP_MD_CTX md;
++ EVP_MD_CTX *md = EVP_MD_CTX_create();
+ char digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE], tmp[16];
+ char md5str[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE * 8];
+ unsigned int i, size = 0;
+
+- EVP_DigestInit(&md, EVP_md5());
+- EVP_DigestUpdate(&md, rsabuf, SECUREVNC_RSA_PUBKEY_SIZE);
+- EVP_DigestFinal(&md, (unsigned char *)digest, &size);
++ EVP_DigestInit(md, EVP_md5());
++ EVP_DigestUpdate(md, rsabuf, SECUREVNC_RSA_PUBKEY_SIZE);
++ EVP_DigestFinal(md, (unsigned char *)digest, &size);
+
+ memset(md5str, 0, sizeof(md5str));
+ for (i=0; i < size; i++) {
+@@ -1075,6 +1078,7 @@ static char *rsa_md5_sum(unsigned char*
+ sprintf(tmp, "%02x", (int) uc);
+ strcat(md5str, tmp);
+ }
++ EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(md);
+ return strdup(md5str);
+ }
+
+@@ -1184,7 +1188,7 @@ static void sslexit(char *msg) {
+
+ static void securevnc_setup(int conn1, int conn2) {
+ RSA *rsa = NULL;
+- EVP_CIPHER_CTX init_ctx;
++ EVP_CIPHER_CTX *init_ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
+ unsigned char keystr[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH];
+ unsigned char *rsabuf, *rsasav;
+ unsigned char *encrypted_keybuf;
+@@ -1203,6 +1207,8 @@ static void securevnc_setup(int conn1, i
+
+ ERR_load_crypto_strings();
+
++ if (!init_ctx) sslexit("securevnc_setup: EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new() failed");
++
+ /* alloc and read from server the 270 comprising the rsa public key: */
+ rsabuf = (unsigned char *) calloc(SECUREVNC_RSA_PUBKEY_SIZE, 1);
+ rsasav = (unsigned char *) calloc(SECUREVNC_RSA_PUBKEY_SIZE, 1);
+@@ -1323,8 +1329,7 @@ static void securevnc_setup(int conn1, i
+ /*
+ * Back to the work involving the tmp obscuring key:
+ */
+- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&init_ctx);
+- rc = EVP_CipherInit_ex(&init_ctx, EVP_rc4(), NULL, initkey, NULL, 1);
++ rc = EVP_CipherInit_ex(init_ctx, EVP_rc4(), NULL, initkey, NULL, 1);
+ if (rc == 0) {
+ sslexit("securevnc_setup: EVP_CipherInit_ex(init_ctx) failed");
+ }
+@@ -1340,13 +1345,13 @@ static void securevnc_setup(int conn1, i
+ /* decode with the tmp key */
+ if (n > 0) {
+ memset(to_viewer, 0, sizeof(to_viewer));
+- if (EVP_CipherUpdate(&init_ctx, to_viewer, &len, buf, n) == 0) {
++ if (EVP_CipherUpdate(init_ctx, to_viewer, &len, buf, n) == 0) {
+ sslexit("securevnc_setup: EVP_CipherUpdate(init_ctx) failed");
+ exit(1);
+ }
+ to_viewer_len = len;
+ }
+- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&init_ctx);
++ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(init_ctx);
+ free(initkey);
+
+ /* print what we would send to the viewer (sent below): */
+@@ -1407,7 +1412,7 @@ static void securevnc_setup(int conn1, i
+
+ if (client_auth_req && client_auth) {
+ RSA *client_rsa = load_client_auth(client_auth);
+- EVP_MD_CTX dctx;
++ EVP_MD_CTX *dctx = EVP_MD_CTX_create();
+ unsigned char digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE], *signature;
+ unsigned int ndig = 0, nsig = 0;
+
+@@ -1421,8 +1426,8 @@ static void securevnc_setup(int conn1, i
+ exit(1);
+ }
+
+- EVP_DigestInit(&dctx, EVP_sha1());
+- EVP_DigestUpdate(&dctx, keystr, SECUREVNC_KEY_SIZE);
++ EVP_DigestInit(dctx, EVP_sha1());
++ EVP_DigestUpdate(dctx, keystr, SECUREVNC_KEY_SIZE);
+ /*
+ * Without something like the following MITM is still possible.
+ * This is because the MITM knows keystr and can use it with
+@@ -1433,7 +1438,7 @@ static void securevnc_setup(int conn1, i
+ * he doesn't have Viewer_ClientAuth.pkey.
+ */
+ if (0) {
+- EVP_DigestUpdate(&dctx, rsasav, SECUREVNC_RSA_PUBKEY_SIZE);
++ EVP_DigestUpdate(dctx, rsasav, SECUREVNC_RSA_PUBKEY_SIZE);
+ if (!keystore_verified) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "securevnc_setup:\n");
+ fprintf(stderr, "securevnc_setup: Warning: even *WITH* Client Authentication in SecureVNC,\n");
+@@ -1456,7 +1461,8 @@ static void securevnc_setup(int conn1, i
+ fprintf(stderr, "securevnc_setup:\n");
+ }
+ }
+- EVP_DigestFinal(&dctx, (unsigned char *)digest, &ndig);
++ EVP_DigestFinal(dctx, (unsigned char *)digest, &ndig);
++ EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(dctx);
+
+ signature = (unsigned char *) calloc(RSA_size(client_rsa), 1);
+ RSA_sign(NID_sha1, digest, ndig, signature, &nsig, client_rsa);