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author | Colin Arnott | 2015-12-15 05:28:41 +0000 |
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committer | Colin Arnott | 2015-12-15 05:28:41 +0000 |
commit | 32c88940f8582958d85974d376221afdb54b20b9 (patch) | |
tree | 40f16208385d03f875ecca47d0a99a4e71bc6350 /torrc | |
download | aur-32c88940f8582958d85974d376221afdb54b20b9.tar.gz |
initial commit, mostly stolen from tor-git, with a new patch file added
Diffstat (limited to 'torrc')
-rw-r--r-- | torrc | 229 |
1 files changed, 229 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/torrc b/torrc new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..2197fe623221 --- /dev/null +++ b/torrc @@ -0,0 +1,229 @@ +## CONFIGURED FOR ARCHLINUX + +## Last updated 9 October 2013 for Tor 0.2.5.2-alpha. +## (may or may not work for much older or much newer versions of Tor.) +## +## Lines that begin with "## " try to explain what's going on. Lines +## that begin with just "#" are disabled commands: you can enable them +## by removing the "#" symbol. +## +## See 'man tor', or https://www.torproject.org/docs/tor-manual.html, +## for more options you can use in this file. +## +## Tor will look for this file in various places based on your platform: +## https://www.torproject.org/docs/faq#torrc + + +## Tor opens a socks proxy on port 9050 by default -- even if you don't +## configure one below. Set "SocksPort 0" if you plan to run Tor only +## as a relay, and not make any local application connections yourself. +SocksPort 127.0.0.1:9050 # Default: Bind to localhost:9050 for local connections. +#SocksPort 192.168.0.1:9100 # Bind to this address:port too. + +## If non-zero, open this port to listen for UDP DNS requests, and resolve +## them anonymously. This port only handles A, AAAA, and PTR requests +## it doesn’t handle arbitrary DNS request types. +#DNSPort 127.0.0.1:9053 + +## Entry policies to allow/deny SOCKS requests based on IP address. +## First entry that matches wins. If no SocksPolicy is set, we accept +## all (and only) requests that reach a SocksPort. Untrusted users who +## can access your SocksPort may be able to learn about the connections +## you make. +#SocksPolicy accept 192.168.0.0/16 +#SocksPolicy reject * + +## Logs go to stdout at level "notice" unless redirected by something +## else, like one of the below lines. You can have as many Log lines as +## you want. +## +## We advise using "notice" in most cases, since anything more verbose +## may provide sensitive information to an attacker who obtains the logs. +## +## Send all messages of level 'notice' or higher to /var/log/tor/notices.log +#Log notice file /var/log/tor/notices.log +## Send every possible message to /var/log/tor/debug.log +#Log debug file /var/log/tor/debug.log +## Use the system log instead of Tor's logfiles +#Log notice syslog +## To send all messages to stderr: +#Log debug stderr + +## Uncomment this to start the process in the background... or use +## --runasdaemon 1 on the command line. This is ignored on Windows; +## see the FAQ entry if you want Tor to run as an NT service. +RunAsDaemon 1 +User tor + +## The directory for keeping all the keys/etc. By default, we store +## things in $HOME/.tor on Unix, and in Application Data\tor on Windows. +DataDirectory /var/lib/tor + +## The port on which Tor will listen for local connections from Tor +## controller applications, as documented in control-spec.txt. +#ControlPort 9051 +## If you enable the controlport, be sure to enable one of these +## authentication methods, to prevent attackers from accessing it. +#HashedControlPassword 16:872860B76453A77D60CA2BB8C1A7042072093276A3D701AD684053EC4C +#CookieAuthentication 1 + +############### This section is just for location-hidden services ### + +## Once you have configured a hidden service, you can look at the +## contents of the file ".../hidden_service/hostname" for the address +## to tell people. +## +## HiddenServicePort x y:z says to redirect requests on port x to the +## address y:z. + +#HiddenServiceDir /var/lib/tor/hidden_service/ +#HiddenServicePort 80 127.0.0.1:80 + +#HiddenServiceDir /var/lib/tor/other_hidden_service/ +#HiddenServicePort 80 127.0.0.1:80 +#HiddenServicePort 22 127.0.0.1:22 + +################ This section is just for relays ##################### +# +## See https://www.torproject.org/docs/tor-doc-relay for details. + +## Required: what port to advertise for incoming Tor connections. +#ORPort 9001 +## If you want to listen on a port other than the one advertised in +## ORPort (e.g. to advertise 443 but bind to 9090), you can do it as +## follows. You'll need to do ipchains or other port forwarding +## yourself to make this work. +#ORPort 443 NoListen +#ORPort 127.0.0.1:9090 NoAdvertise + +## The IP address or full DNS name for incoming connections to your +## relay. Leave commented out and Tor will guess. +#Address noname.example.com + +## If you have multiple network interfaces, you can specify one for +## outgoing traffic to use. +# OutboundBindAddress 10.0.0.5 + +## A handle for your relay, so people don't have to refer to it by key. +#Nickname ididnteditheconfig + +## Define these to limit how much relayed traffic you will allow. Your +## own traffic is still unthrottled. Note that RelayBandwidthRate must +## be at least 20 KB. +## Note that units for these config options are bytes per second, not bits +## per second, and that prefixes are binary prefixes, i.e. 2^10, 2^20, etc. +#RelayBandwidthRate 100 KB # Throttle traffic to 100KB/s (800Kbps) +#RelayBandwidthBurst 200 KB # But allow bursts up to 200KB/s (1600Kbps) + +## Use these to restrict the maximum traffic per day, week, or month. +## Note that this threshold applies separately to sent and received bytes, +## not to their sum: setting "4 GB" may allow up to 8 GB total before +## hibernating. +## +## Set a maximum of 4 gigabytes each way per period. +#AccountingMax 4 GB +## Each period starts daily at midnight (AccountingMax is per day) +#AccountingStart day 00:00 +## Each period starts on the 3rd of the month at 15:00 (AccountingMax +## is per month) +#AccountingStart month 3 15:00 + +## Contact info to be published in the directory, so we can contact you +## if your relay is misconfigured or something else goes wrong. Google +## indexes this, so spammers might also collect it. +#ContactInfo Random Person <nobody AT example dot com> +## You might also include your PGP or GPG fingerprint if you have one: +#ContactInfo 0xFFFFFFFF Random Person <nobody AT example dot com> + +## Uncomment this to mirror directory information for others. Please do +## if you have enough bandwidth. +#DirPort 9030 # what port to advertise for directory connections +## If you want to listen on a port other than the one advertised in +## DirPort (e.g. to advertise 80 but bind to 9091), you can do it as +## follows. below too. You'll need to do ipchains or other port +## forwarding yourself to make this work. +#DirPort 80 NoListen +#DirPort 127.0.0.1:9091 NoAdvertise +## Uncomment to return an arbitrary blob of html on your DirPort. Now you +## can explain what Tor is if anybody wonders why your IP address is +## contacting them. See contrib/tor-exit-notice.html in Tor's source +## distribution for a sample. +#DirPortFrontPage /etc/tor/tor-exit-notice.html + +## Uncomment this if you run more than one Tor relay, and add the identity +## key fingerprint of each Tor relay you control, even if they're on +## different networks. You declare it here so Tor clients can avoid +## using more than one of your relays in a single circuit. See +## https://www.torproject.org/docs/faq#MultipleRelays +## However, you should never include a bridge's fingerprint here, as it would +## break its concealability and potentionally reveal its IP/TCP address. +#MyFamily $keyid,$keyid,... + +## A comma-separated list of exit policies. They're considered first +## to last, and the first match wins. If you want to _replace_ +## the default exit policy, end this with either a reject *:* or an +## accept *:*. Otherwise, you're _augmenting_ (prepending to) the +## default exit policy. Leave commented to just use the default, which is +## described in the man page or at +## https://www.torproject.org/documentation.html +## +## Look at https://www.torproject.org/faq-abuse.html#TypicalAbuses +## for issues you might encounter if you use the default exit policy. +## +## If certain IPs and ports are blocked externally, e.g. by your firewall, +## you should update your exit policy to reflect this -- otherwise Tor +## users will be told that those destinations are down. +## +## For security, by default Tor rejects connections to private (local) +## networks, including to your public IP address. See the man page entry +## for ExitPolicyRejectPrivate if you want to allow "exit enclaving". +## +#ExitPolicy accept *:6660-6667,reject *:* # allow irc ports but no more +#ExitPolicy accept *:119 # accept nntp as well as default exit policy +#ExitPolicy reject *:* # no exits allowed + +## Bridge relays (or "bridges") are Tor relays that aren't listed in the +## main directory. Since there is no complete public list of them, even an +## ISP that filters connections to all the known Tor relays probably +## won't be able to block all the bridges. Also, websites won't treat you +## differently because they won't know you're running Tor. If you can +## be a real relay, please do; but if not, be a bridge! +#BridgeRelay 1 +## By default, Tor will advertise your bridge to users through various +## mechanisms like https://bridges.torproject.org/. If you want to run +## a private bridge, for example because you'll give out your bridge +## address manually to your friends, uncomment this line: +#PublishServerDescriptor 0 + +## This is useful when running on flash memory or other media that support only +## a limited number of writes. +#AvoidDiskWrites 1 + +## BAD NODES - http://xqz3u5drneuzhaeo.onion/users/badtornodes +## The following list provides information about relays that have been checked +## for injecting content over HTTP-connections. +ExcludeNodes $bbefffa108ad16b8e5f0323cf086811c17190bba, $2d5e2ca4b22809379b36028da5b7cb453671e5b6, \ + $5eb6c2094c4ac42d3fbd1cba25fc3b4196e2ff83, $c813d142c092ac01f2f20970dba7086b8a7e52a3, \ + $9c8bb2a38d99283c4acefb1ad4f52a23413787d6, $7c18ee0cb68a259ba6ce0001f2f7b8180a875a6d, \ + $47bbde163dc80f5f5e666698ab4b97900dcff929, $acbacb92581c078cc6e285075cfef467e9ccf76a, \ + $5d84518804ab4b032531b2647603fe1c5e569c26, $2d9a667f3d44f2a3296800bdd310c3747dc8f465, \ + $1824cc33499fd55920a804c66bbaa05669d43117, $4205c064e59aaafeadd2ace80d705183c4f2758a, \ + $14f04a0861b913bfcac1eabac74a1f47bdf41f3a, $1f9803d6ade967718912622ac876feef1088cfaa, \ + $90804a60f89789d44a16a88596598fbc8f5e177b, $0d4f72f90e50b6f5967c4c7267354b22fa48ea86, \ + $eda829cba890bbb30fe5be04779d83044126ba67, $c0e236c6e9a6b29efe247dcbc8a1eaaac247770c, \ + $192fa9d6e9a27024f6e733a6196d33cc8425d1c9, $fe0551589d19dcbeb193fe78a9a003a8a2fc09aa, \ + $2539ea281de61d5b289f580af52dde9a42cdae36, $6c7c819f808ac125c69e1d981f350dcba44da8b5, \ + $35bdc6486420efd442c985d8d3c074988bfe544b, $43be706e24143ab6b3b86dbf7cd4fde1e0c4caf1, \ + $103827708bd078eec737137585eccb5bcea6424b, $8ff73b8fbfbf2ccb52a8e46a515418f97a69c812, \ + $94cbe5df362142d06de73b102e054442cfe627c9, $f2244a8d5da14359cda1dab70f328e62e74e9837, \ + $14be6d0789a234bc4c1866b809d8062d22ee38cf, $9e6ee731a0dec6c65bb4bfb8dd2be461b6e58144, \ + $2cb53ff756483b738e7b0b39ada3453b5259a1f3, $0077b6576a668f861f9f41fdf8da7795c8bb86d5, \ + $c9be2c39ca4e6f120293c80d2cbe2bc34f3a1f30, $bcc93397b50c1ac75c94452954a5bcda01f47215, \ + $ee25656d71db9a82c8efd8c4a99ddbec89f24a67, $1caa0aff0a8236fa7f83f392c11b76cf7eeaac60, \ + $28151be14cb5c22a236163c3e97409d6fd607356, $1b777f2c879c76fc529d1ec63508aad0e1759e79, \ + $53c4c4e1741ca61ad4f09cc9eae8abe1fd92f08b + +## If StrictNodes is set to 1, Tor will treat the ExcludeNodes option as a +## requirement to follow for all the circuits you generate, even if doing so +## will break functionality for you. +#StrictNodes 1 |