1 files changed, 0 insertions, 122 deletions
diff --git a/0001-ZEN-Add-sysctl-and-CONFIG-to-disallow-unprivileged-CLONE_NEWUSER.patch b/0001-ZEN-Add-sysctl-and-CONFIG-to-disallow-unprivileged-CLONE_NEWUSER.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 5301464f63c0..000000000000
--- a/0001-ZEN-Add-sysctl-and-CONFIG-to-disallow-unprivileged-CLONE_NEWUSER.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,122 +0,0 @@
---- a/include/linux/sysctl.h	2020-06-12 19:27:22.382363840 +0200
-+++ b/include/linux/sysctl.h	2020-06-12 19:27:04.715697333 +0200
-@@ -204,6 +204,10 @@ extern int unaligned_enabled;
- extern int unaligned_dump_stack;
- extern int no_unaligned_warning;
- 
-+#ifdef CONFIG_USER_NS
-+extern int unprivileged_userns_clone;
-+#endif
-+
- extern struct ctl_table sysctl_mount_point[];
- extern struct ctl_table random_table[];
- extern struct ctl_table firmware_config_table[];
-
-diff --git a/init/Kconfig b/init/Kconfig
-index bd7d650d4a99..658f9c052151 100644
---- a/init/Kconfig
-+++ b/init/Kconfig
-@@ -1091,6 +1091,22 @@ config USER_NS
- 
- 	  If unsure, say N.
- 
-+config USER_NS_UNPRIVILEGED
-+	bool "Allow unprivileged users to create namespaces"
-+	default y
-+	depends on USER_NS
-+	help
-+	  When disabled, unprivileged users will not be able to create
-+	  new namespaces. Allowing users to create their own namespaces
-+	  has been part of several recent local privilege escalation
-+	  exploits, so if you need user namespaces but are
-+	  paranoid^Wsecurity-conscious you want to disable this.
-+
-+	  This setting can be overridden at runtime via the
-+	  kernel.unprivileged_userns_clone sysctl.
-+
-+	  If unsure, say Y.
-+
- config PID_NS
- 	bool "PID Namespaces"
- 	default y
-diff --git a/kernel/fork.c b/kernel/fork.c
-index 541fd805fb88..ffd57c812153 100644
---- a/kernel/fork.c
-+++ b/kernel/fork.c
-@@ -106,6 +106,11 @@
- 
- #define CREATE_TRACE_POINTS
- #include <trace/events/task.h>
-+#ifdef CONFIG_USER_NS
-+extern int unprivileged_userns_clone;
-+#else
-+#define unprivileged_userns_clone 0
-+#endif
- 
- /*
-  * Minimum number of threads to boot the kernel
-@@ -1788,6 +1793,10 @@ static __latent_entropy struct task_struct *copy_process(
- 	if ((clone_flags & (CLONE_NEWUSER|CLONE_FS)) == (CLONE_NEWUSER|CLONE_FS))
- 		return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
- 
-+	if ((clone_flags & CLONE_NEWUSER) && !unprivileged_userns_clone)
-+		if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
-+			return ERR_PTR(-EPERM);
-+
- 	/*
- 	 * Thread groups must share signals as well, and detached threads
- 	 * can only be started up within the thread group.
-@@ -2819,6 +2828,12 @@ int ksys_unshare(unsigned long unshare_flags)
- 	if (unshare_flags & CLONE_NEWNS)
- 		unshare_flags |= CLONE_FS;
- 
-+	if ((unshare_flags & CLONE_NEWUSER) && !unprivileged_userns_clone) {
-+		err = -EPERM;
-+		if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
-+			goto bad_unshare_out;
-+	}
-+
- 	err = check_unshare_flags(unshare_flags);
- 	if (err)
- 		goto bad_unshare_out;
-diff --git a/kernel/sysctl.c b/kernel/sysctl.c
-index 078950d9605b..baead3605bbe 100644
---- a/kernel/sysctl.c
-+++ b/kernel/sysctl.c
-@@ -545,6 +548,15 @@ static struct ctl_table kern_table[] = {
- 		.proc_handler	= proc_dointvec,
- 	},
- #endif
-+#ifdef CONFIG_USER_NS
-+	{
-+		.procname	= "unprivileged_userns_clone",
-+		.data		= &unprivileged_userns_clone,
-+		.maxlen		= sizeof(int),
-+		.mode		= 0644,
-+		.proc_handler	= proc_dointvec,
-+	},
-+#endif
- #ifdef CONFIG_PROC_SYSCTL
- 	{
- 		.procname	= "tainted",
-diff --git a/kernel/user_namespace.c b/kernel/user_namespace.c
-index 8eadadc478f9..c36ecd19562c 100644
---- a/kernel/user_namespace.c
-+++ b/kernel/user_namespace.c
-@@ -21,6 +21,13 @@
- #include <linux/bsearch.h>
- #include <linux/sort.h>
- 
-+/* sysctl */
-+#ifdef CONFIG_USER_NS_UNPRIVILEGED
-+int unprivileged_userns_clone = 1;
-+#else
-+int unprivileged_userns_clone;
-+#endif
-+
- static struct kmem_cache *user_ns_cachep __read_mostly;
- static DEFINE_MUTEX(userns_state_mutex);
- 
--- 
-cgit v1.2.1-1-g437b
-