From 0d08f6e05307e6184dd245d6ad5b1964758dfd7e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Jan Alexander Steffens (heftig)" Date: Mon, 16 Sep 2019 04:53:20 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 1/9] ZEN: Add sysctl and CONFIG to disallow unprivileged CLONE_NEWUSER Our default behavior continues to match the vanilla kernel. --- include/linux/user_namespace.h | 4 ++++ init/Kconfig | 16 ++++++++++++++++ kernel/fork.c | 14 ++++++++++++++ kernel/sysctl.c | 12 ++++++++++++ kernel/user_namespace.c | 7 +++++++ 5 files changed, 53 insertions(+) diff --git a/include/linux/user_namespace.h b/include/linux/user_namespace.h index 33a4240e6a6f..82213f9c4c17 100644 --- a/include/linux/user_namespace.h +++ b/include/linux/user_namespace.h @@ -139,6 +139,8 @@ static inline void set_rlimit_ucount_max(struct user_namespace *ns, #ifdef CONFIG_USER_NS +extern int unprivileged_userns_clone; + static inline struct user_namespace *get_user_ns(struct user_namespace *ns) { if (ns) @@ -172,6 +174,8 @@ extern bool current_in_userns(const struct user_namespace *target_ns); struct ns_common *ns_get_owner(struct ns_common *ns); #else +#define unprivileged_userns_clone 0 + static inline struct user_namespace *get_user_ns(struct user_namespace *ns) { return &init_user_ns; diff --git a/init/Kconfig b/init/Kconfig index e9119bf54b1f..a1a5a68aea07 100644 --- a/init/Kconfig +++ b/init/Kconfig @@ -1231,6 +1231,22 @@ config USER_NS If unsure, say N. +config USER_NS_UNPRIVILEGED + bool "Allow unprivileged users to create namespaces" + default y + depends on USER_NS + help + When disabled, unprivileged users will not be able to create + new namespaces. Allowing users to create their own namespaces + has been part of several recent local privilege escalation + exploits, so if you need user namespaces but are + paranoid^Wsecurity-conscious you want to disable this. + + This setting can be overridden at runtime via the + kernel.unprivileged_userns_clone sysctl. + + If unsure, say Y. + config PID_NS bool "PID Namespaces" default y diff --git a/kernel/fork.c b/kernel/fork.c index f1e89007f228..49144b49a3d1 100644 --- a/kernel/fork.c +++ b/kernel/fork.c @@ -98,6 +98,10 @@ #include #include +#ifdef CONFIG_USER_NS +#include +#endif + #include #include #include @@ -1922,6 +1926,10 @@ static __latent_entropy struct task_struct *copy_process( if ((clone_flags & (CLONE_NEWUSER|CLONE_FS)) == (CLONE_NEWUSER|CLONE_FS)) return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); + if ((clone_flags & CLONE_NEWUSER) && !unprivileged_userns_clone) + if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) + return ERR_PTR(-EPERM); + /* * Thread groups must share signals as well, and detached threads * can only be started up within the thread group. @@ -3036,6 +3044,12 @@ int ksys_unshare(unsigned long unshare_flags) if (unshare_flags & CLONE_NEWNS) unshare_flags |= CLONE_FS; + if ((unshare_flags & CLONE_NEWUSER) && !unprivileged_userns_clone) { + err = -EPERM; + if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) + goto bad_unshare_out; + } + err = check_unshare_flags(unshare_flags); if (err) goto bad_unshare_out; diff --git a/kernel/sysctl.c b/kernel/sysctl.c index 730ab56d9e92..6cf4e5c36ec9 100644 --- a/kernel/sysctl.c +++ b/kernel/sysctl.c @@ -91,6 +91,9 @@ #if defined(CONFIG_PROVE_LOCKING) || defined(CONFIG_LOCK_STAT) #include #endif +#ifdef CONFIG_USER_NS +#include +#endif #if defined(CONFIG_SYSCTL) @@ -1814,6 +1817,15 @@ static struct ctl_table kern_table[] = { .mode = 0644, .proc_handler = proc_dointvec, }, +#ifdef CONFIG_USER_NS + { + .procname = "unprivileged_userns_clone", + .data = &unprivileged_userns_clone, + .maxlen = sizeof(int), + .mode = 0644, + .proc_handler = proc_dointvec, + }, +#endif #ifdef CONFIG_PROC_SYSCTL { .procname = "tainted", diff --git a/kernel/user_namespace.c b/kernel/user_namespace.c index 5481ba44a8d6..423ab2563ad7 100644 --- a/kernel/user_namespace.c +++ b/kernel/user_namespace.c @@ -21,6 +21,13 @@ #include #include +/* sysctl */ +#ifdef CONFIG_USER_NS_UNPRIVILEGED +int unprivileged_userns_clone = 1; +#else +int unprivileged_userns_clone; +#endif + static struct kmem_cache *user_ns_cachep __read_mostly; static DEFINE_MUTEX(userns_state_mutex); -- 2.36.0