The PKGBUILD fetches SHA256 checksums at build time via _dist_checksum(), which downloads them from torproject.org. This defeats the purpose of checksum verification - a compromised server could serve both malicious archives AND matching checksums. Additionally, the fallback to sha256sums-unsigned-build.txt further weakens security if the signed version is unavailable.
This breaks makepkg's security model where checksums should be hardcoded in the PKGBUILD. While GPG signature verification provides some protection (if users import the key as instructed), relying solely on runtime-fetched checksums is problematic.
Do I miss something? If not, is it really necessary to let it fetch the checksums instead of hardcoding them?
Pinned Comments
grufo commented on 2019-08-15 02:22 (UTC)
Before running
makepkg, you must do this (as normal user):$ gpg --auto-key-locate nodefault,wkd --locate-keys torbrowser@torproject.orgIf you want to update tor-browser from AUR without AUR helpers you can run in a terminal:
$ tor-browser -u